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PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO. v. WEILLER.
A stipulation in a bill'of lading that an agreed valuation shall cover loss
or damage from any cause whatever, does not relieve the carrier from lia-
bility for the actual value of goods lost, when the loss has been caused by
his own negligence.
But in such case the owner of the goods which have been lost through
the negligence of the carrier, may recover from him their full actual
value, notwithstanding the fact that a less value was agreed upon and that
in consideration of such agreement a lower rate of freight was charged.
tTcmfLL,, J., dissents.
Error to the Court of Common Pleas No. i, of Philadel-
phia County.
Trespass, by Hermann Weiller against the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company to recover damages for the loss of four
barrels of whiskey, ca.used by the alleged negligence of
defendant. Plea, not guilty.
Upon the trial, before BRiGY, J., it appeared that on June
15, 1887, the defendant received from Moore & Sinnott, at
Belle Vernon, ten barrels of whiskey, to be carried over the
line of its road to Philadelphia, and delivered to Hermann
Weiller, the plaintiff, the owner and consignee thereof.
While the shipment was in the possession of the Pennsylva-
nia Railroad Company, four barrels of the whiskey were lost or
destroyed by a wreck occurring on defendant's railway. The
whiskey was shipped under a bill of lading, of which the
material clauses were as follows --
Received, June 15, 1887, from Moore & Sinnott, the following described
property, in apparent good order (contents, and condition of contents, of
packages unknown), to be transported to and delivered at the regular
freight station of the company at Philadelphia, Pa., subject to all the con-
ditions following and npon the back of this receilt, and to be delivered in
like good order, subject to the said conditions, upon payment of freight
and advanced charges, and upon payment also of all charges accruing
under the said conditions.
It is initdally agreed, and it is the spirit of this contract, wthat the
Pennsylvania Railroad Company, hereinafter designated the carrier, shall
transport the above-named merchandise with all due care and dispatch to
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its destination, or to the terminus of its line in the direction of destina-
tion, and tender it to the consignee, or to the connecting carrier, as the
case may be, in the same apparent good order and condition in which it
was receipted for at point of shipment, and in case of loss from any
cause within the carrier's reasonable control, shall pay for the same at the
net invoice price, freight charges added if paid (unless a lower value of
the articles has been agreed upon with the shippers, and such value noted
hereon, or same is determined by the classification upon which the rates
are based), and in case of damage through the negligence of the carrier's
servants, shall pay ajust assessment of same, the carrier to have the full
benefit of any insurance that may have been effected upon or on account
of said goods.
The carrier shall not be liable for loss or damage by causes beyond its
reasonable control, by fire from any cause and wheresoever occurring; by
riots, strikes, or stoppages of labor, or by any of the causes incident to
transportation, such as chafing, heating, freezing, leakage, rust or any
otherreason not directly traceable to the negligence of the carrier's ser-
vants. . .
And, finally, in accepting this shipping receipt, the shipper, owner and
consignee of the goods, and the holder of the shippingreceipt, agree to be
bound by all its stipulations, exceptions, and conditions, whether written
or printed, as fully as if they were all signed by such a shipper, owner,
consignee or holder.
When a valuation as agreed upon shall be named upon this shipping
receipt, it is distinctly understood that such valuation shall cover loss or
damage from any cause whalever.
By a provision of the bill of lading the whiskey was
valued at twenty dollars per barrel. The evidence showed
that this provision was inserted by the shippers, and there
was no question if the case as to their knowledge of the con-
tents and terms of the bill of lading; that there -were two
rates of freight fixed by the company for the carriage of
freight of this character, to wit, thirty-three cents per hun-
dred pounds, and twenty-eight cents per hundred pounds, and
that the lower rate was given to shippers at their own re-
quest, upon their entering into a contract, which was written
into the bill of lading, that in case of any loss or damage no
greater sum should be recovered than the valuation fixed
therein, being in this instance a lower valuation than the
actual value of the whiskey. The defendant offered to pay
the plaintiff for the barrels of whiskey destroyed at the valua-
tion fiked in the bill of lading, to wit, twenty dollars per
barrel. The plaintiff refused this offer.
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Defendant requested the Court to charge-
(1) A common carrier is entitled by agreement with the shipper, and
in consideration of an undertaking to transport merchandise at a low rate
of freight, to limit its liability by fixing a value upon the merchandise,
beyond which it cannot be held responsible. This having been done in
the present case, there can be norecoverybeyond the value of the whiskey
fixed in the bill of lading, to wit, twenty dollars per barrel.
Refused.
(2) Under all the evidence in this case there can be no recovery by the
plaintiff beyond the amount of twenty dollars per barrel for the barrels
of whiskey not delivered, with interest upon that amount from the date
when the delivery should have taken place.
Refused.
The Court charged the jury as follows
"Under my view of this evidence and the papers in the case, I instruct
you to find for the plaintiff for the value of the whiskey less the freight;
that is $257.27 less $I.77, with interest thereon."
Verdict accordingly and judgment thereon. Defendant
then took this writ, assigning for error the charge of the
Court and the refusal of its points.
George Tucker Bisfiham, for plaintiff in error.
Edward H. W4ei, for defendant in error.
GREEN, J., April 21, 1890. In the case of Elki zs v. Em-
fiire Transfiorlation Co. (1876), *81 Pa. 315, no question of
negligence, or of the carrier's right to limit his liability for
his acts of negligence, was raised, discussed, or decided either
in the Court below or in this Court. The reporter says the
cause of action set out in the declaration was the loss of cer-
tain high wines delivered to defendant, but lost by negli-
gence. This is the only reference to the subject of negli-
gence to be found in the entire report of the case. The rec-
ord shows that the case was not tried upon any theory of
negligence, but exclusively upon the terms, and interpreta-
tion of the contract as contained in the bill of lading. No,
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question was made upon the subject of the right of the car-
rier to limit his liabilit3 for the loss occurring by his own
negligence, and we are bound to assume that the facts of the
case did not give rise to such a question. Nothing was said
upon that subject either in the argument of counsel, or in
the charge of the Court below, or in the opinion of this
Court. It was for this reason that no reference was made to
this case in the opinion of this Court in the case of Grogan
& Mferz v. Adams Express Co. (1886), 1i4 Pa. 523. The
same reason is applicable now. It may be that the accident
in the Elkins case was not the result of any negligence of
the carrier. Judging from the names of the counsel con-
cerned, it is almost certain that if the facts had developed a
case of negligence, and the question of the right of the car-
rier to limit his liability for acts of negligence, that question
would have been promptly raised, discussed *and decided.
In the present case the question does arise under the con-
ditions annexed to the bill of lading. Many enumerated
causes of loss are expressly excepted, such as fire, riots,
strikes, heating, freezing, leakage, rust, etc., and as to these the
right of the company to limit its liability must be affirmed
in accordance with numerous decisions of this and other
Courts. But the final clause of the conditions stipulates that,
"When a valuation as agreed upon shall be named upon this
shipping receipt, it is distinctly understood that such valua-
tion shall cover loss or damage from any cause whatever."
As this necessarily includes loss arising from negligence, and
as the testimony tended to establish a loss by negligence, the
question of the efficacy of the clause under consideration to
relieve the company from liability for negligence beyond the
agreed value, necessarily arises. Upon that subject we have
so recently expressed ourselves in the case of Grogan &
Merz v. Adams Exfress Co., sufra, that we think it unnec-
essary to repeat either the text or substance of the opinion
there announced. So far as the question at issue is con-
cerned, we can see no difference between that case and
this.
VOL. XXXVIII.-49.
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Judgment affirmed.
MITCHELL, J., (dissenting.) To allow a shipper to value
his goods for purposes of freight charges, etc., at one price,
and then when they are lost, to recover, as in this case, three
times his own agreed value, is a direct premium on fraud
such as no Court. ought to sanction. The public policy
which prohibits a common carrier from contracting against
the negligence of his employes, or, expressing the rule in
commercial language, which prohibits a shipper from becom-
ing his own insurer against accidental loss, if he so chooses,
by paying a lower rate of freight, was founded upon a condi-
tion of things which has passed away, and the rule itself
should, in my opinion, be materially modified, if not
abrogated altogether in regard to goods. That, however, is
an alteration of the law which is legislative in its scope and
-cannot be properly made by the Courts. I am, therefore, in
:favor of adhering to the rule as far as it has been settled by
the decisions, but would not extend it in the slightest de-
:gree. In this case the public were offered two plans: a full
liability at a regilar rate, or a stipulated maximum liability
at a reduced rate. The plaintiff, with full knowledge, chose
the latter. Upon the reasonableness of such a regulation,
the argument of Lord BLAcl.BuRl, in Manchester S. & L.
BRy. Co. v. Brown (1883), L. R. 8 App. Cases, 703, 712, is
in my judgment unanswerable. "When there has been a
fixed rate, if it be shown in point of fact that although people
can have their goods reasonably carried at that rate, they do
enter into agreements of this sort to have them carried at
another rate, that is extremely strong evidence that the
agreement is reasonable." Instead of "extremely strong," I
should say conclusive. The observations of Lord BRAMi-
WELL, in the same case, are also worthy of careful reading.
Because I believe this case to be a step beyond the pre-
vious decisions on the subject, I am compelled to dissent from
this judgment.
STEmRITT and W uImIA s, JJ., absent.
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The doctrine which is followed
by the majority of the Court in
this case, is in consonance with a
line of Pennsylvania decisions, be-
ginning with Farnham v. Camden
&_f Amboy RR. Co. (1867), 55 Pa.
53- In that case the plaintiffs had
shipped from Philadelphia for New
York certain bales of goods. Sub-
ject to a condition in the bill of
lading that "the responsibility of
the company as carriers of the
within named goods is hereby
limited so as not to exceed $ioo
for every ioo lbs. weight thereof,
and at that rate for a greater or less
quantity, the shipper declining td
pay for any higher risk." The
goods were carried in safety to
New York and deposited under a
shed upon the wharf of the railroad
company, where they were destroy-
ed by fire, the company, however,
being chargeable with no negli-
gence. The Court held that by the
special contract limiting the liabil-
ity of the carrier, its liability ceas-
ed to be that of an insurer and be-
came that of a bailee for hire. "It
does not admit of a doubt," said
THo &so, J., "that a common
carrier may by a special contract,
and perhaps by notice, limit his
liability for loss or injury to goods
carried by him, as to every caise of
injury, excepting that arising from
his own or the negligence of his
servants. A great variety of cases
cited in the very able argument of
the learned counsel for the defend-
ants [JAM.FS E. GOWEN and ASA
I. nIsH, one of the original editors
of the AMERICA.N LAW ReGISTIR]
established this as the rule in Eng-
land, from Southcote's .Case, 4
Coke's Rep. 84, A. D. i6oi, idown
to The Peninsular and Oriental
Steam Navigation Co. v. The
Hon. Farquhar Shand, ii Jurist,
771, in 1865. The same rule gen-
erally holds in the several States
in this country, as will appear in
Story on Bailments, 549, notes a and
b; Dov v. New Jersey Steam Vav-
igation Co. (1854), I Kern (N. Y.)
484; and in the Supreme Court of the
United States in York Co. v. The
Central RR. Co. (i866), 3 Wall.
(70 U. S.) 107. This haslongbeen
the rule in this State, as is shown
by Bingham v. Rogers (;843), 6 W.
and S. (Pa.) 495 ; Laing v. Colder
(1848), 8 Pa. 479; Camden &
Am boy RR. Co, v. Baldauf (I85i),
16 Id. 67; Chouteaux v. Leech
(1852), iS Id. 224; Goldey v. Penn-
sylvania RR. Co. (1858), 3oId. 242;
and Pennsylvania RR. Co. v. Hen-
derson (i865), 51 Pa. 315. ' But,
he adds, "the doctrine is firmly
settled that a common carrier can-
not limit his liability so as to cover
his own or his servants' negligence,
nor do I suppose this possible o~f
any bailee."
The next case was American
Express Co. v. Sands (1867),.55 Pa.
14o, decided at the same term of
Court. Sands had shipped a bar-
rel-saw by the Express Company
from Pittsburgh to Irvine, Warren
Co., Pa. When delivered, the saw
was cracked and useless, and was
therefore not accepted. Sands
brought suit against the company,
claiming as damages the full value
of the saw and obtained a verdict
for $475, upon which the Court
entered judgment, notwithstanding
the fact that the bill of lading had
contained a stipulation that the Ex-
press Company was not to be held
liable "for any loss or damage of
any box, package or thing for over
$5o, unless the just and true value
thereof is herein stated," there be-
ing no other statement of the value
of the article shipped. Judge
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(afterwards Chief Justice) THOMP-
SON, again delivered the opinion
of the Court, which was as follows:
"The principles involved in this
case were all discussed in an opin-
ion delivered at this term, Farn-
ham v. Camden & Amboy RR.
Co., sipra. It was there held that
the company might limit the ex-
tent of liability in case of loss or
injury, by a special contract or
special acceptance of the goods to
be carried, and thus become subject
to the laws of bailment only; but
that there could be no limitation
of liability where the loss or injury
resulted from the negligence of the
company or its servants. Was
there negligence in the case before
us? There are numerous authori-
ties cited in the case referred to, to
show that when goods are lost or
damaged while in the custody of
the carrier under a special contract,
and he gives no account of how it
occurred, a presumption of negli-
gence will follow of course. That
is just the case before us, and hence
it was right to hold the company
liable to the extent of the full value
of the saw."
The authority chiefly relied on
by the majority of the Court in the
principal case, is Grogan v. Adams
Express Co. (1886), 114 Pa. 523.
In that case the plaintiffs had ship-
ped by. the express company a
package containingjewelry, valued
at $198. The shipping receipt
contained the following clause:
" Nor in any event shall the holder
hereof demand payment beyond
the sum of fifty dollars, at which
the article forwarded is hereby
valued, unless otherwise herein ex-
pressed, or unless specially insured
by them and so specified in this re-
ceipt." The Court below instruct-
ed the jury that this clause was a
valuation and a binding contract,
"a determination on the part of
these parties as to the value of that
package, and governs this transac-
tion, unless the company took and
appropriated it to its own use when
it would have to pay the whole of
it." In this instruction the Court
expressly followed Hart v. Penn-
sylvania RR. Co. (1884), 112 U. S.
331, a case which will be discussed
later in this annotation. In re-
versing the lower Court, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court (GnEEN,
1.), after commenting upon the
three cases already cited, go on to
say: "Howis it in the case at
bar? We think that it must be
conceded that by the terms of the
express receipt, signed by the com-
pany's agent, and delivered to, and
accepted by the plaintiffs, the
article shipped was valued at fifty
dollars, and the company limited
its liability to that sum, and this
limitation would be a protection
against liability beyond that
amount, except for negligence. It
is a contract almost precisely simi-
lar to the one upon which we pass-
ed, in the case of the American.
Express Co. v. Sands, supra, but
is stronger than that in favor of the
carrier, because it contains an ex-
press agreement that the article
forwarded was valued at fifty dol-
lars, which the receipt in the Sands
case did not. But the Express
Company in the present case failed
to account for the non-delivery of
the article, and hence a presump-
tion of negligence arose, which
they should have rebutted in order
to escape liability, but they did not
doso. * * * The learned Court
further charged the jury that the
defendant could limit its own lia-
bility, even as against its own negli-
gence, and had done so by the re-
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ceipt given to the plaintiffs when
the goods were shipped. This was
done in obedience to a decision of
the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Hart v. Penn-
sylvania RR. Co., supra. An* ex-
amination of that case shows that
such is the law as declared by that
Court, and if the decision were of
binding authority upon us, we
-would be obliged to follow it. But
our own decisions for a long time
have established the opposite doc-
trine, until it has become firmly
fixed in our system of jurispru-
dence. We could not depart from
it now without overruling them all,
and we are not willing to do so.
'The authorities upon the general
subject are very numerous and con-
"flicting. But with us the rule has
been uniform and we prefer to ad-
'here to it."
Prior to Grogan v. Adams .Ex-
.press Co., the case of Elkins v.
Empire Transportation Co. (1876),
Si *Pa. 315, had come before the
same Court. This was an action
for the value of fifty barrels of high
wines, which had been shipped
under a bill of lading containing a
stipulation that the amount of loss
,or damage should "be computed
at the value or cost of said goods or
property at the place and time of
shipment." The rate of freight,
4150 cents per ioo pounds," and
the words "Valuation $20 per bar-
rel" were written in the blanks of
the printed bill of lading. The re-
port of the case shows that a por-
tion of the goods were lost by an
accident on the railroad, which
does not seem to have been ex-
plained by the Transportation Com-
pany, so as to relieve it from the
presumption of negligence, which
was alleged in the declaration.
The Court below charged that "if
there was no contract limiting the
responsibility, they (the carriers)
are responsible for the whole loss ;
but if there was a contract, either
express or implied, that they were
not to be held liable beyond$20 per
barrel, they are not liable beyond
that." This instruction -was as-
signed as error, but the Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment, say-
ing: "The valuation of $2o per
barrel, written into the blank of
the printed bill of lading, together
with the stipulated freight at fifty
cents per one hundred pounds, are
controlling parts of the bill of lad-
ing, and not controlled by the
printed stipulation that the amount
of the loss or damage accruing and
falling on the carriers shall be com-
puted at the value or cost of the
goods at the place and time ofship-
ment. These parts, written into
the printed bill, express the true
contract of the parties, and the $2o
per barrel must, therefore, be re-
garded as the value or cost, fixed
by the parties in advance, as that
to be treated as such, as of the time
and place of shipment. This ac-
cords with the evidence that such
freight, if left to be determined in
value at the place and time of ship-
ment, would not be carried at less
than $i.6o per one hundred pounds.
There was ample consideration,
therefore, for the low valuation in
this diminution of the freight as
stipulated at fifty cents." This de-
cision is apparently in conflict with
the other Pennsylvania cases, but
is distinguished in the majority
opinion in the principal case.
In Pennsylvania RR. Co. v.
Raiordon (1888), 119 Pa. 577, a
still later case than those cited by
the majority of the Court, it was
said in an opinion by W:r IAxasJ.:
"It is too late to deny that in
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Pennsylvania a common carrier
may limit his liability by a special
contract. In lttwood v. Reliance
Transportation Co. (1839), 9 Watts
(Pa.) 87, GIBSON, C. J., recognized
the rule as well established, al-
though expressing grave doubts of
its wisdom. In Laing v. Colder
(1848), 8 Pa. 479, this Court again
gave its assent to the rule, while
BELL, J., by whom the opinion was
delivered, expressed his sympathy
with the doubt of Chief Justice
GIBSON. The same rule has been
held in many later cases, among
which are Powell v. Pennsylvania
RR. Co. (1859), 32 Pa. 414 ; Ameri-
can Express Co. v. Sands (1867),
55 Id. 14o; Pennsylvania RR. Co.
v. Miller (1878), 87 Id. 395 ; Adams
Express Co. v. Sharpless (1876),
77 Id. 517; Clydev. Hubbard (1879),
88 Id. 358. It is equally well set-
fled that such limitation does not
relieve the carrier from liability for
his own negligence: Pennsylvania
RR. Co. v. Miller, sup ra. The
reason for this qualification of the
power to limit liability rests on
public policy."
The contrary doctrine to that of
the Pennsylvania cases is broadly
stated by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Hart v. Pennsyl-
vania R. R. Co. (1884), 112 U. S.
331. It is there said by Justice
BLATCHvORD: " It is the law of this
Court, that a common carrier may,
by special contract, limit his com-
mon law liability; but that he can-
not stipulate for exemption from
the consequences of his own negli-
gence or that of his servants: New
Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Mer-
chants' Bank (1848), 6 How. (47 U.
S.) 344; York Co. v. CentralR . R.
Co. (1866), 3 Wall. (70 U. S.) 107 ;
The New York CentralR. R. Co. v.
Lockwood (1873), 17 Id. (84 U. S.)
357 ; The Southern. Express Co. v.
Caldwell (1875), 21 Id. (88 U. S.)
264 ; The Ogdensburg, etc. R. R.
Co. v.Pratt (1875), 22 Id. (89 U. S.)
123;* Bank of Kentucky v. Adams-
Express Co. (1876), 93 U. S. 174;
The Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v.
Stevens(I878),95 Id.655. * * *
To the views announced in these
cases we adhere. But there is not
in them any adjudication on the
particular question now before us.
It may, however, be disposed of
on principles which are well estab-
lished and which do not conflict
with any of the rulings of this
Court. As a general rule, and in
the absence of fraud or imposition,
a common carrier is answerable for
the loss of a package of goods
though he is ignorant of its con-"
tents, and though its contents are
ever so valuable, if he does not
make a special acceptance. This is
reasonable, because he can always
guard himself by a special accept-
ance, or by insisting on being in-
formed of the nature and value of
the articles before receiving them.
If the shipper is guilty of fraud or
imposition, by misrepresenting the
nature or value of the articles, he
destroys his claim to indemnity,
because he has attempted to deprive
the carrier of the right to be com-
pensated in proportion to the value
of the articles and the consequent
risk assumed, and what he has done
has tended to lessen the vigilance
the carrier would otherwise have
bestowed: 2 Kent's Comm. 603,
and cases cited; Relfv. Rapip (1841),
3 XV. & S. (Pa.) 21 ; Dunlap v. In-
ternational Steamboat Co. (1867),
98 Mass. 371 ; The N. Y. Cent. and
Hudson River R. R. Co. v. Fralof-
(1879), ioo U. S. 24. This qualifi-
cation of the liability of the carrier
is reasonable, and is as important
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as the rule which it qualifies. There
is no justice in allowing the shipper
to be paid a large value for an article
which he has induced the carrier to
take at a low rate of freight on the
assertion and agreement that its
value is aless sum than that claimed
after a loss. It is just to hold the
shipper to his agreement, fairly
made, as to value, even where the
loss or injury has occurred through
the negligence of the carrier. The
effect of the agreement is to cheapen
the freight and secure the carriage,
if there is no loss ; and the effect of
disregarding the agreement, after a
loss, is to expose the carrier to a
greater risk than the parties in-
tended he should assume. The
agreement as to value, in this case,
stands as if the carrier had asked
the value of the horses [the
subject matter of the contract
there in question], and had
been told by the plaintiff the sum
inserted in the contract. The limi-
tation as to value has no tendency
to exempt from liability for negli-
gence. It does not induce want of
care. It exacts from the carrier the
measure of care due to the value
agreed on. The carrier is bound to
respond in that value for negligence.
The compensation for carriage is
based on that value. The shipper
is estopped from saying that the
value is greater. The articles have
no greater value, for the purposes
of the contract of transportation,
between the parties to thatcontract.
The carrier must respond for negli-
gence up to that value. It is just
and reasonable that such a contract,
fairly entered into, and where there
is no deceit practised on the ship-
per, should be upheld. There is no
violation of public policy. On the
contrary, it would be unjust and
unreasonable, and would be repug-
nant to the soundest principles of
fair dealing and of the freedom of
contracting, and thus in conflict
with public policy, if a shipper
should be allowed to reap the bene-
fit of the contract if there is no loss,
and to repudiate it in case of loss.
* * * The distinct groundof our
decision in the case at bar is, that
where a contract of the kind, signed
by the shipper, is fairly made,
agreeing on the valuation of the
property carried, with the rate of
freight based on the condition that
the carrier assumes liability only to,
the extent of the agreed valuation,
even in case of loss or damage by
the negligence of the carrier, the
contract will be upheld as a proper
and lawful mode of securing a due
proportion between the amount for
which the carrier may be. respon-
sible and the freight he receives,
and of protecting himself against
extravagant and fanciful valua-
tions."
In the opinion quoted, the fact is
recognized that the decisions in
this country on the question there
discussed, are at variance. It
therefore becomes necessary, to a
full comprehension of the present
status of the law of the United
States upon this subject, to make a.
careful examination of the rulings
of the Courts of last resbrt in the
various States.
In Alabama, the earlier decisions
are in accord with the Pennsyl-
vania rule, but of late the tendency
has been in the contrary direction.
Thus in the earliest case upon the
subject, ilIobile & 0. R. R. Co. v.
Hofikins (i86S), 41 Ala. 486, the
Court held thata limitation of value
"may be made by special contract,
but that a common carrier cannot
exempt himself, by any such con-
tract, from liability for the negli-
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gence, willful default, or tort, of
-himself or his servants; and this
upon the familiar principle, that
whatever has an obvious tendency
to encourage guilty negligence,
fraud or crime, is contrary to public
policy,"-citing Camden & A. R.
R. Co. v..Baldaiuf (185i), 16 Pa. 67-
To the same effect is the doctrine
enunciated in South & North_ Ala.
.R. R. Co. v. Henlein (1875), 52
Ala. 6o6, and Same v. Same (1876),
56 Id. 368, although in these cases
the Court assumed the right to
judge whether the limitation was
justand reasonable, and proportion-
ate "to the real value of the animal
[the subject-matter of the contract
was a mule] and the amount of
freight received." In Ala. Great
Soutlhern R. R. Co. v Little (1882),
71 Ala. 61r, the law is very posi-
tively stated to be that "for the
want of ordinary care, skill and
diligence, from whichaloss results,
the carrier is liable for the value of
the goods, as would be any other
paid bailee or agent, and for ex-
emption from this liability he has
not stipulated, and the law will not
tolerate that he should stipulate."
This case is followed in Louisville
6 N. R. R. Co. v Oden (I885), 8o
Ala. 38, but the latest case, Louis-
ville 6 N. R. R. Co. v. Sherrod
(887), 84 Id. 178, appears to adopt
the views of the United States
Supreme Court. While this case
attempts to distinguish the earlier
Alabama decisions, its practical
effect is to overrule them. It is
there said by CLoP'ToN, J. : "Limi-
tations as to value do not come
under the operation of the rule,
that a carrier cannot, by special
contract, exempt himself from lia-
bility for the consequences of his
own negligences, and ordinarily are
not calculated to induce negligence.
To the amount of the agreed valua-
tion the carrier is responsible for
loss occasioned by his neglect, or
by any of the risks or accidents for
which he isanswerable. No public
good will be subserved by denying
to the parties the right to make
such contracts. The shipper and
the carrier may lawfully contract
as to the valuation of the articles
to be transported. Such special
contract is in the nature of an
agreement to liquidate the damages,
proportionately to the compensation
received for the carriage, and the
responsibility of safely carrying and
delivering. * * * When the
value has been thus fairly agreed on,
the carrier cannot recover a greater
rate, and the shipper should not be
allowed to take benefit of the re-
duced rate, if there is no loss, and
to repudiate the contract, if there
is a loss." The Court, however,
states as a qualification of the rule,
that "such special contracts may
be avoided by wilful or wanton
negligence in disregard of the rights
of the shipper." Under this case,
the Alabama rule must be held to
sustain limitations of value by
special contract, even where the
loss is occasioned by negligence,
provided it is not wilful or wanton.
In Arhansas, the rule of Hart v.
Pa. RR. Co. has been expressly
adopted and followed: St. Louis,
I. A. 6 S. Ry. Co. v. Lesser (1885),
46 Ark. 236; St. Louis, I.. -' & S.
Ry. Co. v. Weakly (1887), 50 Id.
397- In the latter case the Court
say: "As a general rule, the com-
mon carrier is bound to receive and
carry that which is offered to him
for transportation. He ought to be
entitled to a reasonable reward for
his services. As the risk of con-
veying property of confiderable
value is greater than that of small
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value, the care required is, and the
reward should be, greater. It is,
therefore, reasonable and right that
the value of the property shipped
should be ascertained in order that
the carrier may know the extent of
his responsibility and the care and
attention required, and fix the
amount of his reward. * * * If,
therefore, the measure of the lia-
bility of the carrier as agreed upon
is adjusted by the reward to be re-
ceived by the carrier under his con-
tract, and the contract of shipment
is fairly entered into, and no deceit
is practised upon the shipper, the
contract is reasonable as to the
measure of liability and should be
upheld." In both of these cases
negligence was alleged.
LIn California, the question
would seem to be governed by the
Civil Code of that State, which pro-
vides: "Snc. 2174, The obligation
of a common carrier cannot be
limited by general notice on his
part, but may be limited by special
-contract.
"SEc. 2175, A common carrier
-cannot be exonerated by any agree-
nent made in anticipation thereof,
from liability for the gross negli-
gence, fraud or willful wrong of
himselfor his servants.
"SEC.217 6 , A passenger,consignor
,or consignee, by accepting a ticket,
bill of lading, or written contract for
carriage, with a knowledge of its
terms, assents to the rate of hire,
the time, place and manner of de-
livery therein stated, and also to
the limitation stated therein upon
the amount of the carrier's liability
in case property carried in packages,
trunks, or boxes is lost or injured,
-when the value of such property is
not named; and also to the limita-
tion stated therein to the carrier's
liability for loss or injury to live
animals carried. But his assent to
any other modification of the car-
rier's obligations contained in such
instrument, can be manifested only
by his signature to the same." And
it is further provided by-
"SEc. 22o, A common carrier of
gold, silver, platina, or precious
,stones, or of imitations thereof, in
a manfactured or unmanufactured
state; of timepieces of any descrip-
tion ; of negotiable paper or other
valuable writings ; of pictures, glass,
or china ware; of statuary, silk, or
laces ; or of plated ware of any kind,
is not liable for more than fifty dol-
lars upon the loss or injury of any
one package of such articles, unless
he has notice, upon his receipt
thereof, by mark upon the package
or otherwise, of the nature of the
freight; nor is such carrier liable
upon any package carried for more
than the value of the articles named
in the receipt or the bill of lading."
The recent case of Scamnmon v.
Wells, Fargo and Co. (1890), 84 Cal.
311, was decided under this last
section, the Court saying, "this
measure of damages was adopted
for the protection of the carrier, and
does no injustice to the owner."
[In Orms6y v. U. P. Ry. Co.
(i88o), U. S. C. Ct., D. Colorado, 2
McCrary 48, there was a printed
statement appended to the con-
tract, headed "Rules and regula-
tions for the transportation of live
stock," which contained a schedule
of amounts for which the com-
pany would be liable in case of
damage or injury to such live stock,
but such statement was not signed
by the plaintiff or his agent. The
Court therefore charged the jury
that the statement was "not in the
contract, *' * * that the ship-
per is only bound by the stipula-
I
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lions contained in the contract it-
self," and that such "rules and
regulations for the transportation
of live stock, printed at the head of
this contract, * * are notapart
of the contract with this plaintiff."
In Overland Mail 6' Express Co.
v. Carroll (1883), 7 Colo. 43, the
Court said: "Appellant [the Com-
pany] could not make a binding
contract with the owner, whereby
it should be released from all lia-
bility in case of loss through negli-
gence. Upon the same principle,
it could not make a. binding con-
tract with him limiting its liability
for loss occasioned by its negli-
gence to fifty dollars, or to any
other sum short of the actual value
of the goods shipped, provided of
course, that it had notice of such
actual value when it received
them."
[In Lawrence and others v. The
New York, Providence 6 Boston
RR. Co. (1869), 36 Conn. 63, there
was a clause in the bill of lading
"that no responsibility will be ad-
mitted under any circumstances to
a greater amount upon any article
of freight than two hundred dollars,
unless upon notice given of euch
amount, and a special agreement
therefor." The Court below charg-
ed the jury that the plaintiffs were
entitled to the full value of the
goods lost, but the appellate Court
said, " This was clearly wrong.
There was no claim or pretense of
any gross negligence on the part of
the defendants. They stored the
goods in their depot, because the
boat that evening was so full that
that it could not take them. They
had therefore to lie over for the
boat of the following day; and in
the meantime, they were destroyed
by an accidental fire. And it is
admitted that no notice was given
of the value of the packages be-
yond two hundred dollars. We
think, therefore, that the most the
plaintiffs should have been per-
mitted to recover is two hundred
dollars for each package, instead
of the full value of the packages."
The case of Welch, v. The Boston
&' Albany RR. Co. (1874), 44
Conn. 333, supports the rule that if
a special contract relieves from all
liability, it is void. If it limits re-
sponsibility to the exercise of ordi-
nary care, * * the company
have the benefit of their contract.
[In Dakota, the question is gov-
erned by the Civil Code, which pro-
vides, " 1261, The obligations of
a common carrier-cannot be limited
by general notice on his part, but
may be limited by special contract.
" 1262, A common carrier can-
not be exonerated by any agree-
ment, made in anticipation thereof,
from liability for the gross negli-
gence, fraud, or willful wrong of
himself or his servants.
" 1263, A passenger, consignor,
or consignee, by accepting a ticket,
bill of lading, or written contract
for carriage, with a knowledge of
its terms, assents to the rate of
hire, the time, place and manner
of delivery therein stated. But his
assent to the other modifications of
the carrier's rights or obligations
contained in such instrument can
only be manifested by his signature
to the same." The case of Hart-
well v. N. P. E. Co. (1889), 5 Dak.
463, was decided under these sec-
tions. There, the defendants sought
to free themselves from liability on
the ground that there was a special
contract limiting the amount to be
claimed, and the time within
which notice of loss was to be
PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO. V. WEILLER. 779
given, but the Court held there was
no special contract, the plaintiff
not having signed any document or
paper, the receipt being a mere
notice which would not limit the
carrier's liability.
[In the Districlof Columbia, the
carrier is held liable for the actual
value of the goods, for in Gall v.
Adams Express Company (1879),
M eArthur & Mackey (S. Ct. D. C.)
124, JAM ES, J., says: "We hold
* * that the principle of law
which for considerations of public
welfare forbids a common carrier to
bargain in particular cases for com-
plete exemption from responsibility
for a violation of his duties, forbids
him to impair his obligations to the
community by bargaining in par-
ticular cases for an exemption from
a considerable part of that respon-
sibility. The ground on which the
rule is based, that even the ship-
per's perfect consent can notwholly
relieve the carrier, is, that the ob-
ject which he undertakes to regu-
late by contract is not his own but
a public right. * * The princi-.
ple of the rule is that an agreement
which operates to interfere with the
public right touching the care and.
good faith of common carriers, is
an agreement against public policy
and welfare, and is, therefore, void;
and as an agreement that his negli-
gence shall be cheap must operate
in this way, it necessarily falls
within that principle." In this
case the carrier's liability was
limited to fifty dollars unless spe-
cially insured, and specified in the
receipt.
[The Code of Georgia provides,
" 2068, a common carrier cannot
limit his legal liability by any notice
given, either by publication or by
entry on receipts given on tickets
sold. He may make an express
contract and will then be governed
thereby." In Southern Express
Co.v. Newby (x867), 36 Ga. 635, it
was held under this section, that a.
receipt stipulating for exemption
from liability and limiting the
amount to be recovered to a certain
amountper package, unless the real
value be named at the time of ship-
ment, was not a special contract
within the section, and the company
were therefore liable for the full
value. To the same effect, Purcell
v. Southern Express Co. (I866), 34.
Id. 515.
[In Illinois, there would seem to
be some conflict of opinion upon
the question. The Western Trans-
portation Co. v. .Vewhall, et al.
(186o), 24 Ill. 466, was a case where
there were certain qualifications
and conditions on the back of the
receipt, which the company con-
tended formed a part of its contract,
and there the Court say, "We be-
lieve the rule to be now well settled,
that the common law liability of a
common carrier cannot be so re-
stricted, for notwithstanding the
notice, the owner has a right to in-
sist that the carrier shall receive
and carry the goods, subject to all
the incidents of his employment,
and there can be no presumption
when they are delivered to, and re-
ceived by, the carrier, that the
owner intended to abandon any of
his legal rights, or yield to the
wishes of the carrier. * * A corn-
mon carrier being regarded as an
insurer of the goods, and account-
able for any damage orloss that may
happen to them in the course of the
conveyance, unless arising from
the act of God or the public enemy,
it is not deemed salutary policy,
that he shall escape this liability,
by such general notices as we are
considering. He may qualify his.
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liability by a general notice to all
-who may employ him, of any rea-
sonable requisition to be observed
on their part in regard to the man-
X er of delivery and entry of parcels,
and the information to be given to
him of their contents, the rates of
freight and the like ; as for example,
that he will not be responsible for
goods above the value of a certain
sum unless they are entered as such,
and paid for accordingly." Later
cases would, however, seem to con-
flict with this opinion.
In 4dams Express Company v.
Slellaners (1871), 61 Ill. 184, goods
-were shipped from Chicago to New
York, worth in fact $4oo, for which
the company gave a receipt, limit-
ing its liability to $5o, in case of
loss, of which the shipper had
-otice. The Court held that "even
if it should be conceded that the
shipper in this case must be con-
sidered as having assented to the
terms of the bill of lading, we can-
not hold the carrier excused from
the exercise of reasonable and ordi-
nary care. Courts have often had
occasion to express their regret that
common carriers have been per-
-mitted, even by contract, to dis-
charge themselves from the obliga-
tions imposed by the salutary rules
<of the common law. It is very un-
-easonable in the carrier to say that
it will, in no event, be liable beyond
the sum of $5o in the absence of a
special contract, though it may
have received much more than that
sum merely in the way of freight.
If common carriers desire to deal
fairly with the public, it would be
-very easy for them to require the
shipper to specify the value of the
merchandise and insert the amount
in the receipt, making their charges
in proportion to their liability. If
the shipper should falsely state the
value he could not complain at be-
ing held to his own valuation. In
order to prevent the carrier from
releasing himself, by contract, from
all liability, courts have laid down
the rule above stated that he cannot
even by contract, exempt himself
from the exercise of reasonable
care."
[In Oppenheimer &Co.v. U.S.Ex-
press Co. (1873),69 Ill. 62, Mr.Justice
SHELDON in delivering the opinion
of the Court, said: "A distinction
exists between the effect of these
notices by a carrier which seek to
discharge him from duties which
the law has annexed to his employ-
ment, and those, like the one in
question, designed simply to insure
good faith and fair dealing on the
part of his employer-in the former
case notice alone not being effectual,
without an assent to the attempted
restriction ; while in the latter case,
notice alone, if brought home to the
knowledge of the owner of the prop-
erty delivered for carriage, will be
sufficient. * * Thecommon car-
rier is liable, as we find it frequently
laid down, in respect to his reward,
and the compensation should be in
proportion to the risk. As the com-
mon carrier incurs a heavy responsi-
bility, he has a right to demand
from the employer, such informa-
tion as -will enable him to decide
on the proper amount of compensa-
tion for his services and risk, and
the degree of care which he ought
to bestow in discharging his trust.
And such a limitation of the car-
rier's liability as the one in question
is held to be reasonable and con-
sistent with public policy. But in-
dependent of the qualifying provis-
ion contained in the receipt, we
should be inclined to sustain the
defendant's claim of exemption
from liability on the ground of a
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want of good faith in not disclosing
the value of the goods."
[The question was again raised
in Boscowitz et al. v. The Adams
Express Co. (1879), 93 IlL. 523,
where the printed conditions on the
receipt limited the carrier's liability
to $5o, "unless the just and true
value" of the goods "is herein
stated," and here the Court re-
marked, "It is .a proposition so
plain it will not be controverted,
that defendant can claim no exemp-
tion from liability for the loss of
the goods as a common carrier,
except such as given by express
contract. Neither in the written
nor printed part of the receipt is
there any express contract, mak-
ing exemptions in favor of the de-
fendant company. * * But ad-
mitting the conditions in the re-
ceipt were understandingly assent-
ed to by the shippers and became a
binding contract between the
parties, still defendant would be
liable for the full value ofthe goods
if the loss was owing to negligence
on the part of the railroad com-
pany." In this case, SnErLION,
J., delivered a dissenting opinion,
following the lines taken by him
in Oppenheimer &" Co. v. U. S.
Express Co., sup ra.] In the recent
case of Chicago & Nr W. Ry. Co.
v. Chapman, decided May 14,1890,
the Supreme Court say: "We are
not unmindful that a contrary rule
has been announced by courts of
the highest respectability, and
among them the Supreme Court of
the United States. Notwithstand-
ing the great respect we entertain
for the very learned and eminent
tribunals which have thus held, we
are so strongly committed to the
doctrine before announced that we
feel compelled to adhere to the rule
so long and firmly established in
this State. And notwithstanding
the persuasive weight of the rul-
ings of these eminent tribunals,
and of the reasons given for their
decisions, we are still satisfied that
the rule laid down in this State is
based upon sound reason and a wise
public policy, and is also supported
by the decided weight ofauthority."
The rule followed is stated to be
that the carrier " may not exempt
himself from liability for damages
resulting from the gross negligence
or wilful misconduct of himself or
his servants," and this rule is held
to apply to a stipulation as to
value.
[In Indiana the question was
raised in the case of Rosenfeld v.
The Peoiia, D. & E. RR. Co.
(1885), O3 Ind. 21, where blanl-s.
in the bill of lading were filled up
with characters almost illegible,
but which on being interpreted
meant "ILeaks and outs excepted,
$2o railroad valuation." This was
followed by a statement thus, "in
the event of loss or damage under
the provisions of this agreement,
the value or cost at the point of
shipment shall govern the settle-
ment of the same." The company
contended that its liability was
limited to $20. In the opinion of
the Court it is said: "If they may
contract against all liability for
loss by means other than their own
negligence or fraud, of course they
may contract for the amount of re-
covery in such cases. But in case
of a loss through their negligence
or fraud, the same reasons, at first
view, would seem to exist against
contracts limiting the amount of re-
covery as exist against contracts for
total exemption. * * If without
any representation of value by the
shipper, or a request of him for a
statement of value, and without no-
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tice and contract, and a valuable con-
sideration, the carrier should place
a value upon the articles received
for carriage, that would not bind
the shipper. In such case, hewould
clearly have the right to recover
the full value of the articles lost by
the carrier. If, on the other hand,
for the purpose of getting reduced
rates, the shipper should place a
value upon the articles for carriage,
o r if by any kind of artifice he
should induce the carrier to place a
lower value upon the articles, and
thus get seduced rates, it seems to
be settled by the-weight of authority
that he could not recover beyond
the value so fixed by him, or the
value which by deceithe caused the
carrier to fix. * * That carriers
may, by fixing value, limit this
common law liability, it must be
shown that the shipper had some
kind of knowledge of such fixing
of value, and for a sufficient con-
sideration consented thereto, or that
his statements or conduct justified
the carrier in so fixing the value."
The Adams Express Co. v. Harris,
et al. (1889), 120 Ind. 73 to the same
effect.
[The public laws of rowa relat-
ing to Railroads (Rev. Stat. 1888),
provide: "2007, No contract, re-
ceipt, rule, or regulation, shall ex-
empt any corporation engaged
in transporting persons or property
by railway from liability of a com-
mon carrier, or carrier of passen-
gers, which would exist had no
contract, receipt, rule, or regula-
tion, been made or entered into."
By section 3371, the above provis-
ion is applied to. warehousemen
and common carriers. The case of
Hart v. The Chicago &. N. W. Ry.
Co. (1886), 69 Iowa 485, was decid-
ed under this clause, the contract
of carriage limiting the company's
liability to one hundred dollars per
horse. RED, J., there says:
"Whether a common carrier, in
the absence of any statute restrict-
ing his powers in that respect, can,
by rule, regulation or contract,
limit his liability for the property
received by him for carriage, has
been the subject of much discus-
sion, and there is great conflict in
the decision of the courts on the
question. We have no occasion,
however, in this case, to enter into
that question. No one would ques-
tion that in the absence of a con-
tract limiting the amount of his
liability, the shipper would be en-
titled, in case of the destruction or
injury of the property under such
circumstances as that the carrier
was liable for the loss, to recover
full compensation for injuries sus-
tained. The statute quoted above
prohibits the making of any con-
tract that would exempt him from
the liability of a common carrier
which would exist if no contract,
rule or regulation existed. If the
statute is applicable to a contract
in which the understanding is to
transport the property from this
State into another State or territory
of the United States, it cannot be
doubted, we think, that the provis-
ion of the contract in question, by
which it was sought to limit the
liability of defendant for the horses
to an amount less than the actual
value of the property, is repugnant
to its provisions, and consequently
invalid." To the same effect,
AfeCne v. The B., C R. &. N. R.
Co. (1879), 52 Iowa 6oo.
In Kansas, the carrier is held re-
sponsible for the actual value of
goods lost by his own negligence:
Xansas Czty, S.J. &' C. B. RR. Co.
v. Simison (I883), 3o Kan. 645. The
Court adopts in this case the rea-
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soning of the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia in Gall v.
Adams Express Co., supra, and
adds, "While the provision in a
bill of lading or contract between
the shipper and the carrier, thatthe
latter will not be liable beyond a
certain sum expressed in the con-
tract, may be valid to limit the lia-
bility of the carrier as an insurer,
a condition of this character which
seeks to cover the negligence of the
carrier is void."
In Kentucky, the same rule has
been followed: Orndorffv. Adams
Express Co. (1867), 3 Bush. (Ky.)
'94.
[In Little et al v. Boston
Maine RR. (1876), 66 Me. 239,
the Court say: "When the article
is of an extraordinary or unusual
value the carrier would -well be en-
titled to a higher rate of compen-
sation, inasmuch as he might be
reasonably held to a greater degree
of care. * * It seems that com-
mon carriers may limit their lia-
bility by notice brought home to
the owner ot goods before, or at
the time of their delivery, and ex-
pressly or impliedly assented to
by him."
[The case Breime v. Adams
Express Co. (1866), 25 Md. 328,
shows that in that State a carrier
may by special contract limit the
amount of his liability, for there
the Court said, "The receipt exe-
cuted by the appellee [the com-
pany] and accepted by the appel-
lant, constituted the contract be-
tween the parties and both upon
reason and authority, they are
bound by its terms. The contents
and value of the parcel were not
disclosed to the appellee, anditwas
expressly agreed that its value was
fifty dollars. Like in a valued
policy of insurance, to which the
contract in question is analogous,
the amount of risk assumed by the
appellee was fixed by the agree-
ment, and must, in case of loss, be
the measure of the appellant's re-
covery."
In Massackusetts, the rule is in
direct accordance with that estab-
lished by the United States Supreme
Court: Squire v. New York Cen-
tral RR. Co. (1867), 98 Mass. 239;
Graves v. Lake Shore & Af. S.
RR. Co. (1884), 137 Id. 33. In the
latter case the Court (MORTON, C.
J.) say: "The plaintiffs volunta-
rily entered into the contract with
the defendant; no advantage was
taken of them; they deliberately
represented the value of the goods
[high wines] to be $2o per barrel.
The compensation for carriage was
fixed upon this value; the defend-
ant is injured and the plaintiffs are
benefited by this valuation, if it can
now be denied. The plaintiffs can-
not recover a larger sum without
violating their own agreement. Al-
though one of the indirect effects
of such a contract is to limit the
extent of the responsibility of the
carrier for the negligence of his
servants, this was not the purpose
of the contract. We cannot see that
any considerations of a sound pub-
lic policy require that such con-
tracts should be held invalid, or
that a person who in such contract
fixes a value upon his goods which
he entrusts to the carrier, should
not be bound by his valuation."
These cases were expressly affirmed
in Hill v. Boston, H. 7. & W.
RR. Co. (1887), i44 Mass. 284.
[In Mickigan, the Revised Stat-
utes (ed. 1882, pages 843, 879), pro-
vide: " 3328, Any railroad com-
pany organized under this act, re-
ceiving freight for transportation,
shall be entitled to the rights and
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be subject to the liabilities of com-
mon carriers, except, as herein
otherwise provided; but no com-
pany shall be suffered to lessen or
abridge its common law liability as
a common carrier, unless by an
agreement to be signed by both
parties thereto."
" 3418. Thatno railroad com-
pany shall be permitted to change
its common law liability as a com-
mon carrier, by any contract, or in
any other manner, except by a
written contract, none of which
shall be printed, which shaU be
signed by the owner or shipper of
the goods or property to be carried."
This last provision is contained in
ch. 92, of Howell's Annotated
Statutes (ed. 1882, page 879), and
from its heading would seem to ap-
ply to Railroad Companies in gen-
eral, and not like the previous sec-
tion to those organized under the
Statute therein referred to. The
section is headed "Liability of
Railroad Companies as Common
Carriers."
The Minnesota Supreme Court
is apparently in accord with the
principal case, intimating, how-
ever, that an agreement made in
good faith to liquidate the damages
recoverable in case of loss through
the carrier's negligence, would be
enforced. In Mifoulton v. St. Paitd,
A. &. f. Ry. Co. (1883), 31 Minn.
85, that Court said: "The same
reasons which forbid that a com-
mon carrier should, even by ex-
press contract, be absolved from
liability for his own negligence,
stand also in the way of any arbi-
trary preadjustment of the measure
of damages, where the carrier is
partially relieved from such liabil-
ity. It would indeed be absurd to
say that the requirement of the law
as to such responsibility of the car-
rier is absolute, and cannot be laid
aside, even by the agreement of the
parties, but that one-half or three-
fourths of this burden, which the
law compels the carrier to bear,
may be laid aside, by means of a
contract limiting the recovery of'
damages to one-half or one-fourth
of the known value of the property.
This would be mere evasion, which
would not be tolerated. Yet there
is no reason why the contracting
parties may not, in good faith,
agree upon the value of the prop-
erty presented for transportation,
or fairly liquidate the damages
recoverable in accordance with the
supposed value. Such an agree-
ment would not be an abrogation
of the requirements of the law, but
only the application of the law as
it is, by the parties themselves, to
the circumstances of the particular
case. But that the requirements
of the law be not evaded, and its.
purposes frustrated, contracts of
this kind should be closely scruti-
nized."
[In this case, the general regula-
tion attached to the contract, pro-
vided that the company should not
be liable beyond one hundred dol-
lars per head on horses and valu-
able live-stock, except by special
agreement. This clause, the Court
stated, "is plainly opposed to the
law as established, so far as regards
the negligence of the carrier. As
a regulation, it is, therefore, of no,
effect. The law declares that the
carrier shall be liable to the full ex-
tent of the value of the property,
although there be no special agree-
ment."
The Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi has recently passed upon the
question under consideration, tak-
ing its stand in direct accordance
with the doctrine of the principal
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case: Southern Express Co. v.
Seide, S. Ct. Miss., June 2, 1890.
The Court say in this case: "Stip-
ulations in contracts with common
carriers of similar import with that
under consideration have frequently
been presented to the Courts forde-
cision, and it is very generally
held that their effect is to exempt
the carrier from a greater responsi-
bility, only when the loss occurs
without the negligence or fault of
the carrier; but where the loss
springs from negligence, -the full
value may be recovered, notwith-
standing the stipulation." To the
same effect are the earlier cases of
Southern Express Co. v. 'IMoon
(1863), 39 Miss. 822, and Clhicago,
St. L. & JV. 0. RR. Co. v. Abels
(1883), 6o Id. 1017.
In Mlissouri, the question under
discussion was considered in Har-
vey v. Terre Haute 6- I. RR.
Co. (I88i), 74 Mlo. 538, where the
Court said: "We do not regard a
a contract limiting a right of recov-
ery to a sum expressly agreed upon
by the parties as representing the
true value of the property shipped,
as a contract in any degree exempt-
ing the carrier from the consequen-
ces of its own negligence. Such a
contract fairly entered into, leaves
the carrier responsible for its neg-
ligence, and simply fixes therateof
freight and liquidates the damages.
This we think it is competent for
the carrier to do."
[In the more recent case of 1fIc-
Fadden v. The Missouri Pacific
Ry. Co. (1887), 92 Mo. 343, the bill
of lading stipulafed that the defend-
ant should not be liable for more
than one hundred dollars per head
for the mules, which were carried
at a reduced rate. Here RAY, J.,
after commenting upon and exam-
ining Hart v. Pennsylvania RR.,
VOL. XXXVIII.-5o.
supra, M3foullon v. St. Paul Il. &
.3. Ry. Co., supra, and U. S. Ex-
press Co. v. Backman, ifra, re-
marks: "even under the rule de-
clared in the former [Hart v.
Pennsylvania] class of decisions,
these provisions thus employed
and resorted to by common car-
riers to restrict their liability,
are to be tested by their fair-
ness, justice and reasonableness.
The reduced rate, if such it
was, was the consideration for the
exemption from liability beyond.
the one hundred dollars, even in
case of injury and loss from the de-
fendant's negligence." In distin-
guishing the case from Hart v.
Pennsylvania RR., he says: "In
[that case] * the discussion
was had upon the terms of the bill
of lading alone, and as the Court
say, 'without any evidence upon
the subject, and especially in the
absence of evidence to the con-
trary,' and under the qualifications
it contains, we cannot regard it as
controlling authority in a case
where the evidence clearly shows
absence of reduced or lower rate,
or any graduation of compensa-
tion to the valuation. On the one
hand it may be, as is there said, un-
just, unreasonable, and repugnant
to sound principles of fair dealing,
for the shipper to reap the benefits
of a contract, by which he secures
a lower rate than the carrier might
reasonably charge for the service
rendered, if there be no loss, and
to repudiate it in case of loss.
Where the shipper procures the
lawful rates of the carrier to be re-
duced in express consideration of
the agreed value, upon which the
compensation is based, he is, under
numerous authorities, -- - held
to be estopped to say the value is
greater when the loss occurs. On
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the other hand, it would, we think,
be no less unfair, unreasonable and
unjust that the carrier, without any
sacrifice of his interests, or lawful
demands, or diminution of his law-
ful charges, should secure, without
any consideration therefor, such
important advantages and release
of liability to which he would
otherwise be subjected under the
law. "I
[The Compiled Statutes of Ne-
braska (ed. 1889) provide-" Sec.
iii. Any railroad company receiv-
ing freight for transportation shall
be entitled to the same rights and
be subject to the same liabilities as
common carriers. And whenever
two or more railroads are con-
nected together, the company own-
ing either of said roads receiving
freight to be transported to any
place on the line of either of the
roads so connected shall be liable
as common carriers for the de-
livery of such freight to the con-
signee of said freight, in the same
order in which such freight was
shipped."
[Ch. 72, Id. page 628, provides,
"SEc. 5, No notice either express
or implied, shall be held to limit
the liabilities of any railroad com-
pany as common carriers, unless
they shall make it appear, that such
limitation was actually brought to
the knowledge of the opposite
party and assented to by him or
them, in express terms, before such
limitation shall take effect."
[In Article XI. of the Constitu-
tion of this State it is provided,
inter alia, by SEC. 4, "The lia-
bility of railroad corporations as
common carriers, shall never be
limited." In The Atchison C_ Ne-
braska RR. Co. v. Washburn &
Leihy (1876), 5 Neb. 17, the Court
held an agreement limiting the car-
rier's liability to be "in violation
of law and against public policy,"
and could "not lessen the plain-
tiff's responsibility as common car-
rier, nor remove its liability for
negligence of its servants."
[Two cases have very recently
been decided in the Supreme Court'
of New Hampshire upon this ques-
tion, Duntley v. Boston & M. RR.,
July 26, I89O; and Durgin v. Am-
erican- Express Co., July 25, 1890;
they follow the rule as laid down in
Hart v. Pennsylvania RR. Co.,,
subra.
[In New Jersey, the rule as laid
down in Hart v. Pennsylvania RR..
Co., supra, is followed: TheLydian
1onarch (1885), D. Ct., D. N. J.,
23 Fed. Repr. 298.
[The question was raised in New
York, in the case of 11agnin el al.
v. Dinsmore (1874), 56 N. Y. r68,
where the receipt contained, inter
alia, the following clause: "It is
further agreed, and is part of the
consideration of this contract, that
the Adams Express Company are
not to be held liable or responsihle
for the property herein mentioned
for any loss or damage arising from
the dangers of railroad, ocean,
steam, orriver navigation, leakage,
fire, or from any cause whatever,
unless specially insured by them
and so specified in this receipt;
which insurance shall constitute
the limit of the liability of the
Adams Express Company in any
event; and if the value of the prop-
erty above described is not stated
by the shipper, the holder hereof
will not demand of the Adams Ex-
press Company a sum exceeding
fifty dollars for the loss or deten-
tion. of, or damage to the property
aforesaid." JoHsoN, J., who de-
livered the opinion of the Court,
said; "The first question which
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arises in'this case is as to the mean-
ing of the contract under which
the plaintiffs claim to recover
against the defendants; for it is no
longer open to question, in this
State, that in the absence of fraud
or imposition, the rights of carrier
and shipper are controlled by con-
tract, in writing, delivered to the
shipper by the carrier, at the time
of the receipt of property for trans-
portation." But in concluding he
adds, "The terms ofthese contracts
are very much under the control of
the carriers, and they may justly
be required to express in plain
terms the entire exemption for
which they stipulate. * * If it
be desired to cover losses by neg-
ligence, it is not too much to say
that the purpose must be clearly
expressed." The next case in
which this question was raised, was
Steers v. The Liverpool, lw York
and Philadelphiia Sleamship Co.
(i874), 57 Id. i, which directly fol-
lowed the ruling of the Court in
Belger v. Dinsmore, infra. In
Westcott et al. v. Fargo, President,
etc. (i875), 61 Id. 542, the Court re-
ferring to the cases above mention-
ed, said: "This point must now be
regarded as settled by recent decis-
ions in this Court [The Commis-
sion of Appeals] and in the Court
of Appeals. The result of these
cases is, that it is lawful for a car-
rier to make such a contract as was
entered into in the present case,
exempting him from liability and
that he may, by clear and distinct
expressions, relieve himself from
losses occasioned by his own negli-
gence. On the otherhand, general
words, 'such as that he will not be
liable for loss, or detention, or
damage,' are not to be construed to
extend to losses, etc., occasioned
by negligence."] In Magnin v.
Dinsmore (1877), 70 Id. 41o, ALLiEN,
J., says: "The act which will de-
prive of the benefit of a contract
for a limited liability fairly made,
must be an affirmative act of wrong
doing, not merely ordinary neglect
in the course of the bailment. It
need not necessarily be intentional
wrong doing, but the mere omis-
sion of ordinary care in the safe
keeping and carriage of the goods
is not the misfeasance intended by
the authorities."
[To the same effect is the earlier
case of Belger v. Dinsmore (I872),
51 Id. i66, where the receipt given
limited the defendant's liability to
fifty dollars unless otherwise ex-
pressed, and the Court held that
"a party accepting such an instru-
ment * * declares his assent by
such acceptance, to those terms
and conditions."
[in North Carolina, the rule is
established that a common carrier
being an insurer against all losses
and damages, except those occur-
ring from the act of God or the
public enemy, may* by special
notice brought to the knowledge of
the owner of goods delivered for
transportation, or by contract, re-
strict his liability as an insurer,
where there is no negligence on
his part. He cannot by contract
even limit his responsibility for loss
or damage resulting from his want
of the due exercise ot ordinary
care. A contract restricting the
liability of the carrier must be
reasonable, and not calculated to
ensnare or defraud the other party.
Cap ehart v. Seaboard & Roanoke
RR. Co. (1879), Si N. C. 438. Here
the bill of lading stipulated that in
case of any claim for damages to
the articles mentioned therein, the
extent of such damage should be
adjusted before the removal from
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the station, and claim therefor
made in thirty days, and the Court
held it unreasonable. In every
case, the restriction must be brought
to the knowledge of the consignor,
and a restriction in a bill of lading
given at the time of the delivery of
the goods, and received by the ship-
per without remonstrance or ob-
o jection, is equivalent to an express
contract: Whitehead v. Wilining-
ton & Weldon RR. Co., 87 N. C.
255. In Weinberg v. Albemarle
& Raleigh RR. Co. (1884), 91 Id.
31, the Court said, "the bill of lad-
ing was evidence of a contract be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant,
and the former is bound by all the
stipulations therein that were law-
ful and did not contravene public
policy in respect to common car-
riers."
The Ohio Supreme Court is in
full accord with the Pennsylvania
cases. The question under consid-
eration arose in U. S. Exfpress Co.
v. Backman (1875), 28 Ohio St.
144, where the Court said: "The
Ohio cases hbreinbefore cited make
it clear that common carriers can-
not, by contract, exempt them-
selves from liability for full damages
for a loss occasioned by their own
negligence or that of their servants.
No more can they legally stipulate
.for a partial exemption from lia-
bility caused by like negligence.
The public policy that avoids a
contract for total exemption, will
hold a contract void that provides
for partial exemption in such case.
The fact that by reason of such con-
tract the carrier undertook the
transportation of the goods for a di-
minished reward will avail him
nothing."
[The General Statutes (ed. 1882,
p. 389) of South Carolina provide
-" Snc. 1333. No public notice
or declaration shall limit or in any
wise affect the liability at common
law of any public common carriers
for or in iespect of any goods to be
carried and conveyed by them; but
they shall be liable, as at common
law, to answer for the loss of or in-
jury to any articles and goods de-
livered to them for transportation,
any public notice or declaration by
them made and given contrary
thereto or in anywiselimiting such
liability notwithstanding." Under
this section the case of Piedmont
.l'anzfacuring Couizany v. Colum-
bia & Greenville RR. Co. (I882)
19 S. C. 353, held "that common
carriers in this State cannot limit
their common law responsibilityby
any * * special contract for or
in respect of any goods to be car-
ried by them."
In Tennessee, the question of the
effect of- contracts containing a
stipulated valuation hds recently
been elaborately considered in the
case of Louisville &_ N. RR. Co. v.
Wynne, S. Ct. Tenn., Jan. 2, i89o.
After stating the general rule that
" common carriers may limit their
liability by special contract, provid-
ed afways, that such limitation shall
not operate to exempt them from the
consequences of their own negli-
gence, or that of their servants,"
the opinion of the Court in this
case goes on to say : " Is the limi-
tation in the contract before us
within the prohibition of this
eminently just and generally ac-
cepted principle? Manifestly the
stipulation does not contemplate
total exemption from liability;
it only provides for partial or
limited exemption. Upon that dis-
tinction, the nice and important
question arises, can a stipulation of
the latter character stand before the'
law ,when one of the former kind
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-cannot? Or, to state the same
question differently, and so as to
apply it more directly to the facts
of this case, the rule of law being
established, as we have seen it is,
that the defendant company could
not lawfully have contracted with
the plaintiff that it would in no
event be liable for any part of the
value of the mare, if lost or de-
stroyed, can the limitation of its
liability to $ioo be upheld in the
courts, if it should appear that her
death resulted from the negligence
of the company, and that she was
in fact worth eight times that
amount, as thejury found her to be ?
We unhesitatingly answer, 'No.'
The carrier cannot by contract ex-
-cuse itself from liability for the
whole nor any part of a loss
brought about by its negligence.
To our minds it is perfectly clear
that the two kinds of stipulation
-that providing for total, and that
providing for partial, exemption
from liability for the consequences
of the carrier's negligence-stand
upon the same ground, and mustbe
tested by the same principles. If
one can be enforced, the other can ;
if either be invalid, both must be
held to be so, the same considera-
tions of public policy operating in
each case. With great deference
for those who may differ with us,
we think it entirely illogical and
unreasonable to say, that the car-
rier may not absolve itself from
liability for the whole value of
property lost or destroyed through
its negligence, but that it may ab-
solve itself from responsibility
for one-half, three-fourths, seven-
eighths, nine-tenths, or ninety-
hundredths of the loss so occasion-
ed. With great unanimity the auth-
orities say that it cannot do the for-
mer. If allowed to do the latter, it
may thereby substantially evade
and nullify the law, which says it
shall not do the former, and in that
way do indirectly what it is forbid-
den to do directly. We holdthat it
can do neither. The requirement
of the law has ever been, and is
now, that the common carrier shall
be diligent and careful in the trans-
portation of its freight, and public
policy forbids that it shall throw off
that obligation by stipulation for
exemption in whole or in part from
the consequences of its negligent
acts. This view is sustained by
sound reason, and also by the
weight of authority." The Court
attempts, however, in a subsequent
portion of the opinion, to distin-
guish this case from Hart v. Penn-
sylvania RR. Co. (IS 4 ), 112 U. S.
331, for the.reason that in the latter
case "there was an agreed valuation
stated in the contract as the basis
of the carrier's charges and respon-
sibility, and the Court very prop-
erly held that in such cases, the
shipper was estopped to claim
a greater sum than the agreed
valuation. Though evident from
the reasoning in the body of the
opinion in the Hart Case, which
may now be called the leading case
in America, the Court is careful to
say, in conclusion, that the decision
is based alone upon the ground
above stated." The stipulation in
the Tennessee case -was as follows:
"And it is further agreed that
should damage occur for which
[the carrier] may be liable, the
value at the place and date of
shipment shall govern the settle-
ment, in which the amount claim-
ed shall not exceed" a specified
sum. The distinction appears to
be drawn from the fact that no
abatement of freight charges was
made in consideration of this stip-
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ulation, and the Court intimates
that, had such been the case, it
would have followed the ruling in
the Hart Case. Such a course
would, however, seem inconsistent
with the reasoning just quoted.
The Tennessee Supreme Court
expressed the same view of the law
in Coward v. East Tennessee, V.
&. G. RR. Co. (i886), I6Lea 225.
[In Texas, the Civil Statutes
(vol. i, ed. 1888) provide: "ART.
278, Railroad companies and other
common carriers of goods, wares
and merchandise, for hire, within
this State, on land, or in boats or
vessels on the waters entirely
within the body of this State, shall
not limit or restrict their liability
as it exists at common law, by any
general or special notice, or by in-
serting exceptions in the bill of lad-
ing or memorandum given upon
tie receipt of the goods for trans-
portation, or in any other manner
whatever, and no special agree-
ment made in contravention of the
foregoing provisions of this article
shall be valid." In the case of A1.
P. Ry. Co. v. Barnes & Co. (1885),
2 Texas App. C. C. 507, the bill of lad-
'ing stipulated that in the event ofthe
loss of the property, "the value or
cost of the same at the point of
shipment" should govern the set-
tlement, and the Court gave judg-
ment for the market value of the
goods, which was greater than the
cost of the same.
[In Vermont, it would seem that
the carrier may by an express con-
tract limit his liability. '" The ex-
press contract," says RlDFIELD, J.,
"I ought, perhaps, to be very clearly
proved, and in water carriage is
usually required to appear in the
bill of lading. But a mere general
notice, when brought to the know-
ledge of the owner, ought not, per-
haps, to have that effect, unless
there is, very clear proof, that the
owner expressly assented to that, as
forming the basis of the contract :"
Farmers &' Mechanics' Bank v.
Clam!lin Transporlation Co.
(1851), 23 Vt. i86. To the same
effect, 3fann el al. v. Bichardet al.
(1S67), 40 Id. 326.
[The question of the right of a
common carrier to limit his liability
is provided for by the Code of Vir-
ginia which provides: "SEc; 1296,
No agreement made by a common
carrier for exemption from liability
for injury or loss occasioned by his
own neglect or misconduct, shall
be valid." The case of Virginia
and Tennessee RR. Co. (I875), 26
Gratt. (Va.) 328, further supports
the doctrine that a common carrier
cannot by express contract relieve
himself from liability in any de-
gree from want of care or faithful-
ness in himself or his agents.
[In Richnond & Danville R.
Co. v. Payne, decided in the Sn-
preme Court of Appeals of Va.,
January 3o , 189
o , there was a spe-
cial contract in the bill ofladingfor
the carriage of horses at a reduced
rate, and the amount to be claimed
in case of loss was limited to one
hundred dollars a horse. The
Court said: "There is no doubt
that a common carrier cannot law-
fully stipulate for exemption from
liability for the consequences of his.
own negligence or that of his ser-
vants. * * But that is not the
question before us. The question
here is whether, when a shipper
sig-ns a bill of lading, not exempt-
ing the carrier from liability for
the negligence of himself or hi&
servants, but limiting the amount
in which the carrier shall be liable,
in consideration of the goods being
carried at reduced rates, such a con-
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tract, fairly entered into, is valid
and binding; and we see no reason
why, when its terms are just and
reasonable, it should not be. The
test to be applied in all such cases
is, Was the contract fairly entered
into, and are its terms just and
reasonable ?" After examining
the authorities and especially Hart
v. Pennsylvania, supfra, the Court
continued: "This reasoning [Hart
v. Pennsylvania], which seems to
us sound, is supported by numer-
ous decisions of courts of the high-
est respectability, and is decisive
of the present case."
In Wisconsin, it has been held
-that the carrier cannot by special
contract limit the amount of his
liability, except in case of loss
without fault upon his pait: Black
v. Goodrich Transiortation Co.
(1882) 55 Wis. 319.
The English case of M17anchester,
S. & L..Ry. Co. v. Brown (1883),
L. R. 8 App. Cases, 703, cited by
MITCHELL, J., in his dissenting
opinion, was upon the general ques-
tion of the power ofa carrier to pro-
tect himself by special contract
from the results of hi. and his ser-
vants's negligence, and was decid-
ed under the Railway and Canal
'Traffic Act of 1854 (7 and 18 Vict.
c. 31, sect. 7), which provided that
"every such company shall be
liable for the loss of or for any in-
jury done to any horses, cattle, or
other animals, or to any articles,
good% or things, in the receiving,
forwarding, or delivering thereof,
occasioned by the neglect or de-
fault of such company or its ser-
vants, notvithstanding any notice,
condition, or declaration made and
given by such company contrary
thereto, or in anywise limitingsuch
liability; every such notice, condi-
tibn, or declaration being hereby
declared to be null and void: Pro-
vided always, that nothing herein
contained shall be construed to pre-
vent the said companies from mak-
ing such conditions with respect to
the receiving, forwarding and de-
livering of any of the said animals,
articles, goods, or things, as shall
be adjudged by the Court or Judge
before whom any question relating
thereto shall be tried to be just and
reasonable. * * * Provided
also, that no special contract be-
tween such company and any other
parties respecting the receiving,
forwarding or delivering of any
animals, articles, goods, or things
as aforesaid shall be binding upon
or affect any such party unless the
same be signed by him, or by the
person delivering such animals,
articles, goods, or things respec-
tively for carriage." In the opin-
ion of Lord BLACKBURN, however,
the view is expressed that, irrespec-
tive of the Act, a carrier might by
special contract, if fair and reason-
able, protect himself from the neg-
ligence of his servants (p. 709).
The Fnglish authorities on the gen-
eral question are fully cited in this
case, and in Peek v. North Staf-
fordshire Ry. Co. (1863), io H. I,.
C. 473.
[In conclusion, it may be asked:
Shall an agreed valuation limit the
common law liability? and if so,
how far shall printed or other no-
tice of the terms upon which the
carrier will transport the goods. be
considered as agreed to?
[The first question receives a
negative answer in Colorado (777-8).
District of Columbia (779), Illinois
(779), Iowa (782) by Statute, Kan-
sas (782), Kentucky (783), Missis-
sippi (784-5), Nebraska (786). Ohio
(788), Pennsylvania (766, 771),
South Carolina (788), Tennessee
